When researchers at Boston University (BU) in Massachusetts inserted a gene from the Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 into a strain of the virus from the beginning of the pandemic, they were trying to understand why Omicron causes mild disease.
But the experiments, described in a 14 October preprint, have ignited a red-hot controversy over what constitutes truly risky SARS-CoV-2 research—especially now that much of the world’s population has some immune protection from the virus and COVID-19 treatments are available.
At issue is whether—and when—researchers modifying SARS-CoV-2 or other deadly pathogens need to keep regulators and funding agencies such as the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) informed about their work, even if the agencies didn’t fund the experiments in question.
The discussion around the BU preprint comes amid a years-long effort to revise the US government’s funding guidelines for research involving enhanced PPPs (ePPPs). In February, the NIH asked the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to revisit its current policy, which was set in 2017. The NSABB released draft recommendations in September, and plans to release its final report late this year or early next. One recommendation calls for a significant expansion in the pathogens that could fall under the policy.